By the early 1980s, some commentators inside and outside the profession were wondering whether an American history had disappeared in the onslaught of highly particular studies, often about subgroups in the larger society of the United States. These developments were occurring at a moment when the number of American historians was expanding to an unprecedented degree. Disciplinary expansion both allowed and prompted increased specialization. And that worried some, who began to speak of hyperspecialization and fragmentation. The structure of specialization derived in large part from the impact of a social history that often fused the group-based particularity of focus with ideological commitments to class and identity-based social movements. This pattern of work discouraged the integration of particular histories into some kind of synthesis.8
Traditionalists, perhaps not surprisingly, were unnerved by these developments.9 But even some proponents of the newer history worried. Early on, Herbert G. Gutman, one of the leading figures in the movement to write a history that included all Americans and that recognized differences-class, ethnic, racial, gender-was concerned that instead of enriching and enlarging the usable history of the United States, the new scholarship was failing to do that, perhaps making it in fact less usable. The "new social history," he wrote in the introduction to his collection of pioneering essays in the field, "suffers from a very limiting overspecialization." Take an Irish-born Catholic female textile worker and union organizer in Fall River involved in a disorderly strike in 1875. She might be the subject of nearly a dozen sub-specializations, which would, he feared, "wash out the wholeness that is essential to understanding human behavior."10 Later, in the wake of a national meeting of writers at which historians and history seemed to be largely ignored in discussions of the political and cultural situation in the aftermath of Richard Nixon, Gutman mused aloud in the pages of The Nation over whether the failure of historians to incorporate social history's findings into a new synthesis had seriously diminished, even evacuated, history's possible contribution to public debate."1 In the mid-1980s, in what turned out to be a controversial pair of articles, I raised a related question: how might one construct the (to my mind) needed synthesis of recent historiography on the United States.12 There was considerable negative reaction to those articles, coming from two different positions. One position worried about its critique of specialization and its call for addressing a larger public. These arguments were equated with a carelessness about scholarly rigor.13 The other, and more widespread position, focused on the risks of a national narrative itself. It was evidently feared that such a narrative would, by definition, re-exclude those groups and themes that had so recently been brought under the umbrella of history and would re-inscribe a "master narrative" dominated by white, elite males.14 By the end of the 1980s, however, the question of synthesis had become less controversial. The issue became more practical, more professional in some sense: how to do it and how to do it within the parameters of inclusion that had been central to the discussion from the beginning. It was on this note that Alice Kessler-Harris, the author of the chapter on social history in The New American History (1990 edition), addressed the question. In the last section of her essay, with the section title of "The Problem of Synthesis," she acknowledged the problem and explored various possible ways to overcome "fragmentation" and move toward synthesis.15 A different issue emerged in the 1990s. Poststructuralist literary and cultural theory, sometimes broadly and even more vaguely characterized as postmodernism, was and is suspicious of any aspiration toward a comprehensive narrative. It is to this body of theory that we owe the commonplace use and misuse of the epithet "master narrative." 16 These theories have been rather slow to penetrate workaday historical practice among American historians. Levels and types of awareness of them vary: from shocked indignation at the whole idea, to vague awareness and thoughtless dismissal, to intellectual fascination largely in isolation from the making of one's own histories. In his recent book, Beyond the Great Story: History as Text and Discourse (1995), Robert Berkhofer seeks to force more attention to these issues. Insistently, but not always consistently, he urges historians to recognize the dimensions of the postmodern crisis that surrounds them. He seems more interested in sounding the alarm about the quicksand before us than in guiding us 13 around it or safely through. But either way, he intends to challenge the very possibility of narrative synthesis.17
While these worries, proposals, and polemics were being fashioned, the daily work of historians proceeded. Among the products of that work have been a good number of explicitly synthetic volumes. There is, of course, no clear or settled notion of what defines a work of synthesis. I have used a rather generous definition. Some of the books I am calling synthetic might alternatively be designated as monographs-archivally based but exceptionally ambitious books that tackle big questions and seek to frame a large field or to provide an interpretation for an audience well beyond specialists. Others are more obviously synthetic, relying heavily on secondary literature to establish the state of the art in a broad field for a wide audience, including, often, students and the general public. With this diversity of form, purpose, and audience in mind-as well as a concern for a reasonable distribution of fields and periods-I have, with the help of the editors of the American Historical Review, selected a few recent synthetic works for examina-
The very existence of these books mutes the question of whether we need synthetic works or whether, under the constraints of present historiographical practice, synthesis is possible. In fact, the seeming proliferation of syntheses at present-and their variousness-suggests that the field of American history is at a formative (or reformative) moment that invites synthesis: the quest for new understandings that has undermined established narratives has now, perhaps, prompted new efforts at crystallizing a very unstable body of historical writing into new syntheses.
A different question, however, provides the focus of this essay. What strategies for narrative synthesis are available to historians today? How might we think about the relation between a particular structure of narrative synthesis and the author's purpose or interpretation? How do these different strategies relate to current historiography? What particular work do they do, within the profession and beyond it? And finally I want to ask some questions about the firmness of the boundaries (mostly geographical) that define what is and is not captured in synthetic narratives of U.S. history.
These works do not, of course, cover the whole field of synthetic works. More and other books could have been chosen, but these eleven books (and several others mentioned along the way) at least represent different kinds of history, different 18 None, incidentally though importantly, present themselves as synthetic narratives of the nation, although some to be discussed below certainly reach toward that in practical effect, particularly those authored by Eric Foner (The Story of American Freedom) and by Robert V. Hine and John Mack Faragher (TheAmerican West). In fact, I have recommended each to non-historians asking for a literate one-volume history of the United States. periods, and different themes. Together, the eleven total nearly 6,000 pages of outstanding historical writing. If nothing else, I can conclude that synthetic narrative invites long books.
Because I cannot claim special knowledge in any of the fields being synthesized in these books, I do not propose to do the kind of analysis one would find in specialized reviews. Such criticisms that I have will be framed from the position of my interest in synthetic narrative. I say that in part to be honest about my own limitations in appraising these books but also for another, more positive reason. I want to insist that narrative synthesis is a form of knowledge, indeed, a particularly powerful form of creating, not simply summarizing, knowledge. I hope to get past or under the story enough to probe the implications of different modes of structuring a narrative synthesis. The way different narrative strategies construct that knowledge is important. While inclusion is one of the tests our generation will rightly ask of synthesis, there are other important historiographical issues that are embedded in the question of narrative synthesis.19
The more seriously we consider possible narratives of American history, the more we may be prepared to ask questions that press beyond inclusion. We may even be both bold enough and hopeful enough to worry a little about the language of inclusion, if not the principle. Is there perhaps more than a hint of dominant culture noblesse oblige in the language of inclusion? Might not a more sophisticated notion of the temporal and geographical boundaries of American history, including an awareness of the diasporic stories within American history, complicate and enrich the notion of inclusion?20 Can the historical and historiographical terrain be opened a bit more in a way that enables a deeper, denser, and more complex historiographical exploration of justice and difference at the center of American history? Might democracy be the word, the concept, the commitment that will move us in that direction? As I examine the stack of books before me, I propose to keep these issues in mind and to return to them at the end of this essay. JON BUTLER'S Becoming America: The Revolution before 1776 (2000) covers the whole mainland British colonial space and history, and it addresses a wide range of themes. In fact, themes, not time or chronology, organize his story. His brief, often one-word, chapter titles reveal a very distinctive type of synthesis, one immediately accessible to the reader, whether professional or lay: Peoples, Economy, Politics, Things Material, Things Spiritual. It is a reasonable progression, and in each case he brings together a good deal of material. Although his theme is transformation, Butler also claims (following recent historiography) a more inclusive geography, making more of the middle colonies than would have been the case a generation ago.
In some ways, his manner of organizing the material topically bears a relation to Such an argument demands more complex and careful attention to process and cause than his framing of the book seems to allow. While he has surely gathered together a considerable body of material (his notes run to fifty pages), he has not produced a synthetic narrative of change over time, one that sketches a developmental sequence that integrates disparate elements in the interest of a causal interpretation. By bounding each unit of synthesis, Butler is stuck with a structural isolation of topics that undercuts narrative explanation. Given that Butler's theme is transformation, this narrative structure is crippling.
For reasons related to structure and style of argument, Butler's claims for American modernity are quite vulnerable. While there are doubtless some specific ways in which the British North American colonies became "modern" before independence, they were not uniformly modern-over space or in all aspects of life. Many historians would readily grant numerous anticipations of modernity by the middle of the eighteenth century, but few would insist, with Butler, that so much modernity had been achieved so soon, implying that only a few pre-modern anomalies remained on the eve of revolution.22 Most give a significant role to the revolution.23
But the most serious problem is not with the phenomena he notices or does not notice, even if there is some real unevenness on this point. Rather, it is Butler's teleology of the modern, combined with his exceedingly loose, elusive, and, as is so often said today, undertheorized definition of modernity. Add to this an unnecessary but apparently irresistible tendency to claim American uniqueness and "firsts" for nearly everything he identifies as modern in America. He names a number of phenomena that he considers evidences of the modern-polyglot, slaves, cities, market economy, refined crafts and trades, religious pluralism, and "sophisticated politics." Without further historical specification and theoretical precision, one can indulge in reductio ad absurdum. With the exception of religious pluralism, all of these qualities probably described Athens in the age of Aristotle at least as well as the British colonies. My point here is partly one of fact, of care in making comparative statements without comparison. More important, however, are the criteria of the modern. Few, if any, major political bodies in the past half millennium more successfully accommodated diversity than the Ottomans, yet that achievement has never brought them recognition for a precocious modernity. One needs greater definitional and descriptive specificity to make the argument he claims. Because of the breadth and generality of synthetic narratives, it is especially important to be clear about key concepts.
Similarly, he tends to claim the realization of "Americanness"-here equated with some vague notion of modernity-for events that, however interesting in themselves, hardly sustain his assertion that they designated "the American future."26 For example, writing of the French Huguenots, a group he knows well, he notes their assimilation, and he calls this "American."27 Well, of course it is, but so are the endogenous marriages that continue for various groups well into the twentieth century-sometimes because of racial difference and even legislation (as in the case of African Americans) or out of choice, as in the case of Scandinavians in the upper Midwest. Or to take a more ominous subject, it seems a bit fatalistic to say that colonial encroachment on Indian land "predicted" nineteenth-century relations with the Indians.28 Oddly, such a claim, while taking the moral high ground, nonetheless erases the postcolonial history of the United States by denying contingency and thus diminishing both the capacity and moral responsibility of all later actors or potential actors. The twin and linked teleologies of "modern" and "American" produce a distorting and de-historicizing synthesis.
If there is a problem with the sort of synthesis Butler has written, what precisely is it? He makes historical claims about patterns and meanings of development on the basis of a narrative structure that effectively isolates and de-historicizes his themes. By not constructing a developmental narrative that integrates the various themes now separated in distinct chapters, the process and complexity of development is obscured. While his chapters are full of relevant and interesting details of everyday life, they never get integrated in any individual, institution, or place. In the absence of a narrative of change to explain and interpret, he resorts for a theme to repeated assertions of "modernity." The issue is not so much the claim for an eighteenth-century American modernity-although I am myself drawn to much more complex, nuanced, and contradictory discussions of that theme-as it is the incapacity of the particular model of synthesis he deploys to advance that theme or argument.
Philip Morgan has a quite different strategy. His domain is not the Atlantic but the South, or two regions of the South, which he is anxious to reveal as differentiated. Thus his is a comparative history, comparing two regions within the South. Suggesting a certain scientific aspiration, he refers to his delimited space as a kind of laboratory, a site for an "indirect experiment."32 This approach offers him much. He is able to focus tightly on his questions and generally achieves sharply phrased answers. Yet, like any good scientific laboratory, his field of inquiry is almost hermetically sealed. A two-hundred-page part of the book titled "The Black World" begins with a fifteen-page section on "Africans." Yet it is in only one paragraph at the beginning and a few other scattered references that one reads anything about Africa. His story rarely strays east (or south or north or west) of the Maryland/ Virginia and South Carolina boundaries.
His comparative method has impressive rigor. Yet one senses that not only does his approach trap him within a particular place, he is also caught within a very confining net woven from the existing historiography. As Walter Johnson pointed out in a review of the book in this journal, his questions are smaller than the stories he has unearthed.33 Much like another important book on African-American history, Herbert G. Gutman's The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom (1976), this book, for all its synthetic aspirations, cannot capture some of its best material within the tightly bounded historiographical questions and issues that frame it.34 As in the case of Berlin's book, Morgan's is quite explicit about time and space. There is a well-thought-out chronology of change, and one of his major arguments is that the South, and thus the black as well as white experience, was not uniform over space. He shows real and important distinctions between the experience of What he is doing points toward the most important work that one kind of successful narrative synthesis can do, for the profession and for the public. (other?) once more expansive social sciences. Is this a mere coincidence, or is it an issue to be addressed by the profession? While I would not place Schudson's book in the same class as the scholarship produced by the short list of great historians, he has written a fine book. It is a book about change over time, and he establishes three eras of citizenship and participation, each clearly defined. He does not devote much attention to how each configuration changes into the next, but he effectively characterizes their differences, even in some very brief summaries, as in the following paragraph from early in the book:
Another way to characterize the past three hundred years of political change is to say that the type of authority by which society is governed shifted from personal authority (gentlemen) to interpersonal authority (parties, coalitions, and majorities), to impersonal authority (science, expertise, legal rights, and information) ... The geographical center of politics has shifted from the countryside to the cities to the suburbs and perhaps, today, to "technoburbs," "postsuburbs," or "edge cities," or whatever we name our newer habitations. Correspondingly, the kind of knowledge a good citizen requires has changed: in an age of gentlemen, the citizen's relatively rare entrances into public discussion or controversy could be guided by his knowledge of social position; in the era of rule by majorities, the citizen's voting could be led by the enthusiasm and rhetoric of parties and their most active partisans; in the era of expertise and bureaucracies, the citizens had increasingly to learn to trust their own canvass of newspapers, interest groups, parties, and other sources of knowledge In thinking about the core issue in Foner's narrative, therefore, it seems fair to consider it to be the quest for a democratic liberalism, insisting on the relevance and indispensability of the modifier inserted before liberalism. One might thus characterize Foner's as a democratic synthesis, which, as I suggested above, offers a stronger and more egalitarian standard of judgment than commonplace invocations of inclusion. It offers as well the implication of voice and empowerment.
To Foner, as he indicates in his introduction, "abstract definitions" of freedom are not the focus. His concern is "with the debates and struggles through which freedom acquires concrete meanings, and how understandings of freedom are shaped by, and in turn help to shape, social movements and political and economic events."45 The result is a narrative that is at once focused yet always open to an examination of larger issues, structures, and events that intersect with and often drive his story. It is a dynamic story, filled with actors, with agents making freedom and using freedom. He selects key events or controversies of different eras, events that are widely contested (slavery, labor and property, the role of the state, social movements). Of course, coverage is selective; the gain is the richness deriving from a series of concentrated focal points. In each case, he examines the conflict, the parties contending, and the stakes. He does not hesitate to declare justices and injustices, to name winners and losers, and he does so from a consistently democratic perspective. Foner thus achieves inclusion without the dilution consequent with the faux openness characteristic of talk radio and without the postmodern hesitations that undermine moral judgment. and sharply distinguish between the two aspects of the concept. That openness allows them to tell the history of the United States as a story of successive frontiers, including a fascinating rethinking of American regionalism as urban-centered at the end of the twentieth century.48 In fact, the chapter on the postwar era is a tour de force-imaginative, original, and quite compelling.
In Turnerian fashion, they argue that "westering defined America's unique heritage."49 To a very impressive degree, they give substance to this claim, but recent historiography makes that claim, even for western history, problematic. As Hine and Faragher show, in the nineteenth century as well as today, the West (and the United States) was formed by migrations from west to east and south to north, and even in a limited way north to south, as well as east to west. The notion of westering is so strong in American and European history and culture, it is difficult to construct an alternative narrative structure, though no less important for the difficulty.50 This worry does not, however, undercut another summary point they make: the "frontier is our common past."51
The mainly from a methodology not only local but firmly bounded.57 By contrast, Gordon's The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction exemplifies a microhistory that enables the historian to synthesize the threads of local life, many of which are translocal in origin and implication.58 Unlike Hine and Faragher, she gets inside the subjective experience of local life, even the experience of very ordinary people, without getting trapped inside that world and without implying that the larger world of the region, the nation, and even transnational economic and religious institutions were beyond the ken of her study of a seemingly local conflict.
Mostly, her account is the story of the arrival and fate of Catholic orphans from New York who were to be placed in Catholic homes. The homes were Mexican as well as Catholic, and that was the problem and the focus of conflict. The conflict played out along class, ethnic, religious, and gender lines, and it eventually reached the Supreme Court. It is a compelling and very human narrative, but one that also addresses a whole range of analytical and interpretive issues of broader interest to historians. Bringing the issues of gender, class, and race into relation with each other allows for an appraisal of their relative importance in this particular historical explanation. I think that her story reveals class to be more important than her conclusion argues, but the real point to be made is that only a narrative synthesis that brings diverse threads together will enable the historian and the reader to make this kind of judgment.
These complex ends are achieved in part by her adoption of an imaginative literary strategy. Gordon's book is constructed of two types of chapters. One is quite often a broad frame for local events. In these chapters, her perspective as narrator is exterior to the action. The issues addressed are frequently structural and, as often as not, extend beyond the community. Here, one gets an analytical explanation of the relation of local experience to larger national and international cultural, political, and economic developments. Between these chapters, she has crafted others that get inside the culture of the community, providing wonderfully rich, thick descriptions of daily life and the development of the conflict. With oral histories as well as fragmentary documentary evidence, she brings the reader very close to the experience and voices of the community. The play between these accounts and the more conventional chapters produces an unusual but powerful synthesis.
Whether a microhistory qualifies as a synthesis, even by my generous definition, may be debated. But the singular relevance of this book for the discussion of synthesis concerns not scale but its literary ambition, the literary experiment that gives structure to the book. Those who would write other syntheses-at various scales-will, I hope, be encouraged, even inspired, to experiment with novel narrative strategies in the interest of more powerful representations of the past.
Quintard Taylor relations among different groups in the West, particularly and inevitably between blacks and whites, but also between blacks and Native American, the contribution of the book is otherwise.59 He is mapping and making visible as a whole a history that has been largely unknown or studied in very specific instances and places. Drawing on a substantial body of scholarship, most of it published in the past quarter century, he aims to "reconstruct the history of African American women and men" in the West over five centuries, although mostly his focus is the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Taylor and agency and to consider causal explanation without sacrificing the explication of subjective meaning-and vice versa. The volumes here examined reveal many narrative strategies and quite different relations to a wider reading public. There is no single model, and no one volume (yet) does all the things we might fairly expect in a realized synthesis. In addition, these books, both in what they do and do not do, suggest to me the value of embracing a narrative core that is a more explicit and deeper exploration of democracy and difference, freedom and empowerment, contest and justice. Such a focus promises a sharper analytical history, one more historical and less susceptible to teleology, whether of modernity or anything else.
It seems plausible to propose that a wider canvas, a supranational context, may in fact enhance the examination of these issues. The work of Hine and Faragher, Berlin, Gordon, and Rodgers in particular enables one to imagine an even more radical synthesis of national history, one that operates on multiple geographical scales, from narratives smaller than the nation to supra-national ones-thus identifying the nation as a product of history as well as an object of historical inquiry. Such a framing of national history will increase awareness of the complexity of the multiple axes of historical interaction, causation, and identity formation.
While I mean these concluding comments to suggest an ambitious new agenda for the discipline, we must not overlook an already existing and compelling example. Decades ago, David Brion Davis embarked on a multivolume history that considered all these issues. He brought them together in his majestic synthesis that explores slavery and freedom in the Atlantic world, a history of nearly global reach that is also-and I emphasize this fact-a history of the United States.76 My point, then, is that such histories can be written, have been written, and I trust that more will yet be written.
The present moment seems especially propitious for such histories. The relation of the nation to both subnational and transnational solidarities is very much in question. It is a public concern as well as an object of interdisciplinary scholarly inquiry. Historians surely have an open invitation to rethink the boundaries of national histories.77 Colonial historians have been moving in this direction for some time, redefining their field as the Atlantic world long before the globalization talk. Likewise, Rodgers and Ian Tyrrell, both of whom work on the modern period, moved in this direction fairly early and for a different reason: their concern about the claims of American exceptionalism.78
With these various concerns at work, we may fairly expect a movement of American historians and other historians as well toward a wider sense of their fields. National histories will not be so firmly bounded, and the assumption of their national autarky will be softened by the recognition that national histories are 
